While the news headlines have been preoccupied with the “12 Day War” between the Iranians and the Israelis/Americans, a key player in the Middle East that is becoming much more important is Türkiye. With growing tensions in the region and world, Türkiye aspires to use its middle power status to promote regional stability by acting as a “bridge” between the great powers.
The new Turkish Republic
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, the Republic of Türkiye was established with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as its “Founding Father.” During Atatürk’s presidency, the primary policy agenda was to implement Western and European style reforms to secularize the society, known as Kemalism. Crucially, the military saw itself as the upholder of Atatürk’s legacy and staged coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 to prevent any “Islamist” politician from gaining power.
In its foreign policy, the new republic prioritized its relationship with the West/Europeans, which was solidified when Türkiye joined NATO in 1952, and remains a member to this day. However, tensions with the West were not absent, such as the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974 and the West’s position over recognizing the 1915 Armenian Genocide. (To this day, the Turkish government argues the 1915 Armenian Genocide was not a “genocide.”)
After the Cold War ended, Türkiye went through immense economic and political turmoil, and the military once again intervened in 1997 via a “soft coup” to remove Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan from office, alleging he violated the country’s secularism.
Neo-Ottomanism 1.0: ‘zero problems with neighbors’
A crucial turning point in contemporary Turkish history was the ascendancy of the AK Party, which won the 2002 elections, and Abdullah Gül became the Prime Minister.
The AK Party stands for the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, which translates to “Justice and Development Party.” During this period, the “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy rose to prominence. It is essential to note that neo-Ottomanism does not seek to install an Islamic system in Türkiye, like in Iran post-1979. Rather, this foreign policy school calls for a more moderate version of secularism at home, coming to terms with the Ottoman past, and acting as a “bridge” between the West and the Muslim World, especially after 9/11.
Hence, “neo-Ottomanism 1.0” of “zero problems with neighbors” guided Turkish foreign policy in the early 2000s as it sought to be a “bridge” between the West and the Muslim World. This entailed starting the process to join the European Union, participating in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, expanding economic relations with the Persian Gulf countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE), and attempting to mediate between the Israelis and Palestinians.
In fact, in the early years of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s tenure, there were improvements in Turkish democratization (which was one of the preconditions to join the European Union), such as curtailing the role of the Turkish military in politics.
Neo-Ottomanism 2.0: many problems with neighbors
However, Turkish foreign policy started to take on a more aggressive push in the late 2010s, especially after the failed 2016 coup d’état attempt. Erdoğan used the failed coup attempt to accumulate more power on the grounds of securing the country, and in 2018, the country transitioned from a parliamentary system to a presidential system, giving Erdoğan much more political power at home and abroad. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy has been much more aggressive, resulting in “many problems with neighbors.”
Some of these examples include how Ankara launched military operations in northern Syria to target the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), such as in 2019. Ties with the Arab states, like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, deteriorated over concerns of Ankara’s “neo-Ottoman” behavior in the region. For example, in 2018, the Turkish government renamed the street where the Emirati embassy was located to an Ottoman general whom the Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan accused of pillaging Medina. In addition, Erdoğan also said the UAE was spoiled by oil and money.
In 2020, relations with France nosedived, especially when Erdoğan said French President Emmanuel Macron needed mental treatment over a dispute related to the murder of a French teacher, resulting in France recalling its ambassador to Türkiye. Also in 2020, Erdoğan angered the Iranians when he recited a poem that referenced how the Aras River separated Azerbaijan and the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. In response, the then-Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif criticized Erdoğan and said he needed to educate himself on Iranian history.
A return to ‘zero problems with neighbors?’
Eventually, Ankara realized an aggressive foreign policy was not beneficial to Türkiye, as it made the country more isolated in the region. The backlash of Turkish aggressiveness was symbolized by the creation of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which Cyprus, France, Egypt, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Israel and Palestine are members of.
Hence, starting from 2021-2022, the Turks started to improve relations with the Arab states, since the Turkish economy was in dire need of investment from countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Relations with the Egyptians improved drastically, considering how Erdoğan once called the Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi a “murderer” in 2019 to “my dear brother” in September 2023. Crucially, the Turks have allowed Arab countries, namely Qatar and Egypt, to take the lead in negotiating between Israel and Hamas over the Gaza War, rather than using their close relationship with Hamas to sabotage those ongoing talks.
Importantly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 provided an opportunity for the Turks to improve their relations with the Americans and Europeans. Even though Ankara continued to help Moscow evade the sanctions, the Turks played a key role in supplying the Ukrainians with their Bayraktar drones, which were relatively successful on the battlefield. Importantly, much of the recent negotiations between the Russians and Ukrainians took place in Istanbul, illustrating Ankara’s desire to position itself as a mediator between Kyiv and Moscow — albeit with limited success.
While Türkiye has not resolved all its problems with its neighbors, such as with Greece, and it is only becoming more authoritarian internally, the “12 Day War” between Iran and Israel once again underscores the volatility of the Middle East. As such, it makes the role of middle powers like Türkiye more important than ever to contribute to regional stability, as the U.S. is increasingly seen as the contributor to regional instability by giving a carte blanche to its close ally.
Photo by Hussein A.Himmati on Unsplash
Edited by James Sutton and Kester Kafeero
