Ever since the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) took over Al-Fashir, the Sudanese conflict has reached a new stage of brutality. Following the RSF’s takeover, and within 72 hours, they have perpetuated a mass slaughter of civilians in the area. The RSF’s brutality was so immense the blood was visible from satellites, which caused many to accuse the RSF of committing genocide.
What has also drawn significant attention is the UAE’s support for the RSF and the accusations of its complicity in aiding a genocide. However, the United States’ inability to pressure the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reflects a broader trend of how Middle Eastern powers leverage great power rivalries, such as between the U.S. and China, to protect their interests.
UAE’s early foreign policy
In the early decades since their independence in 1971, UAE’s regional clout was relatively minor.
According to Zaki Nusseibeh, the translator for former Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, external observers, such as journalists and foreign dignitaries, wondered whether the UAE would even survive. Importantly, even today, the UAE’s economy remains heavily dependent on maritime trade from the Persian Gulf, which has been vulnerable to disruptions such as during the Iran-Iraq War.
It wasn’t until Mohamed Bin Zayed rose to power that the UAE began to assert itself in the region. Bin Zayed played a critical role as chief of staff in modernizing UAE’s armed forces and ensuring they participated in active conflict zones. In contrast, others in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) merely increased defense spending. For example, the Emirates participated in the mission to liberate Kuwait and sent forces to fight in Kosovo and Somalia. After 9/11, the UAE was the only Arab country to participate in the Afghan War. At the time, Western officials hailed the Emirati military as the most capable in the region.
Fighting the “Islamists”
During the late 2010s, the UAE positioned itself as the bulwark against “Islamist” movements. In the eyes of Abu Dhabi, “Islamists” can range from terrorist organizations such as ISIS to political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and its regional rivals such as Qatar, Türkiye and Iran. Under this lens, the UAE has intervened in various countries to quell the “Islamist” threat. For example, in 2013, the UAE played a key role in ousting Mohamed Morsi, who is a member of the Muslim Brotherhoo, and installing Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. In 2015, the Emiratis joined Saudi Arabia’s invasion of Yemen to fight the Houthis. The Iranians reportedly backed this insurgent movement.
In 2017, the Emiratis cut diplomatic ties with the Qataris under the accusations of terrorism and banned their news network, Al Jazeera. In 2019, the Emiratis played a role in ousting Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir from power, due to his supposed betrayal of a pledge to distance himself from Islamist organizations. Around the same time, Abu Dhabi backed Khalifa Haftar in the Libyan Civil War, seeing him as a bulwark against Islamist parties. Pertaining to the conflict in Sudan, one of their justifications for backing the RSF was to prevent the emergence of an Islamist government in Khartoum.
In the name of national interest
On the surface, certain American politicians have criticized the UAE’s role in Sudan. However, they are unlikely to follow through on threats to stop arms sales to the UAE in order to maintain good relations.
A primary U.S. concern is China’s growing clout in the Middle East, which threatens American hegemony. Notably, in 2020, the PRC replaced the EU as the Gulf Cooperation Council’s largest trading partner. In the context of Beijing’s growing clout in the region, Washington considers Abu Dhabi as a key regional power to contain China. However, the UAE has insisted it will not choose either side but will engage with all major powers, including Washington, Moscow and Beijing. As part of its foreign policy strategy, Abu Dhabi has often played the “China card” as a counterweight to the U.S.
While the concern about China replacing American security architecture in the Middle East is often exaggerated, it has been powerful enough for the U,S. to turn a blind eye when its Gulf partners are involved in war crimes. For example, after the Saudis murdered journalist Jamal Khashoggi, there were voices in Congress who urged the Trump administration to stop selling arms to Riyadh which were being used for the war in Yemen. At the time, President Donald Trump refused to do so, saying if the U.S. doesn’t sell Saudi weapons, “they’re going to take that money and spend it in Russia or China or someplace else.”
America’s attitude toward Saudi Arabia is not that different from the UAE, and the mere threat of a pivot to China is sufficient to insulate them from U.S. pressure.
With the rise of great-power competition, one consequence is the deprioritization of international law and norms in the name of “national interest,” as seen with U.S. hesitation to call out the UAE. However, paradoxically, it harms those very national interests by emboldening their adversaries to pursue aggressive policies without fear of consequences.
As such, countries around the world must follow through on their threats to rogue nations for violating international law and establish a precedent of repercussions for taking such illegal actions.
Featured image: Photo by Aleksandar Pasaric via Pexels
Edited by Abbigail Earl & James Sutton
