After gaining independence from Britain in 1971, Qatar’s ruling Al Thani family began their reign in the newly independent nation by benefitting from the country’s oil and gas riches. The following two decades was a period of stability, but then on June 27, 1995, a bloodless palace coup changed everything. Crown Prince Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani took control of the government while his father, Emir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, was away in Geneva.
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani promoted the image of a progressive leader focused on law and modernization, but his rule was still highly centralized and authoritarian. Qatar’s political climate was characterized by apathy and little room for dissent.
While Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani was in power, Qatar’s focus with regard to international strategy focused on sporting events and soft power. December 2010 was a turning point in this approach when Qatar won the bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Then, on June 25, 2013, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani voluntarily abdicated in favor of his son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. Tamim, the fourth son, had been appointed heir apparent in August 2003 after his older brother Sheikh Jassim renounced his claim. The transition marked the first voluntary transfer of power in modern Qatari history.
The “modern” Qatar
After the World Cup was won by Argentina on Dec. 18, 2022, the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, placed a bisht (an outer cloak worn by men in the Arab world) on Messi. Messi, then, lifted the World Cup trophy with the bisht on. It was the first and to-date, the only case of a Muslim world leader placing a bisht on a non-Muslim at a global ceremonial occasion. Many critics in the West viewed the act of draping Messi in the bisht as inappropriate.
“This is a magic moment. It’s a shame in a way they’ve covered up Messi in his Argentina shirt,” said former England striker Gary Lineker. The 2022 World Cup was the first held in the Middle East and showcased Qatar’s stadiums, transport systems and hospitality projects.
Politically, Qatar’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood after the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, and its relations with Brotherhood leaders, antagonized neighboring Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They viewed the Brotherhood as a political and existential threat. On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt and other countries severed diplomatic ties and imposed a blockade on Qatar. The Saudi-led coalition issued 13 demands, including cutting ties with Iran, closing Al Jazeera, ending support for the Muslim Brotherhood and aligning with Gulf foreign policy priorities. Qatar rejected the demands, calling them neither reasonable nor actionable.
With Saudi Arabia closing Qatar’s only land border, the use of cargo planes by Iran to move food into Qatar made Iran’s airspace an essential route. Turkey also helped Qatar by dispatching soldiers and by pledging food, water and other supplies. The blockade did not isolate Doha. Instead, it forced Qatar to further extend and diversify its supply routes and alliances.
The most significant factor of the crisis was the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. As the leader of the Shia, Iran, and as the self-styled dominant leader of the Sunni, Saudi Arabia and Iran, backed opposing sides in conflicts across Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Saudi Arabia and the allies perceived Iran as a serious threat and urged the Gulf states to consolidate for defense against Iran. Saudi Arabia and its allies viewed Qatar’s refusal to sever ties with Iran as breaking ranks and pushed for unified Gulf opposition. Qatar’s geographical position reinforced its independent approach. The world’s largest natural gas field, the North Dome and South Pars field, was shared with Iran and it required ongoing economic coordination.
Analysts termed this “strategic hedging,” while Qatar relies on its security ties with the U.S., it simultaneously maintains economic and diplomatic ties with Iran. Sheikh Hamad also expanded Al Udeid Air Base in an attempt to strengthen its relationship with the U.S. Al Udeid was built in 1996 and was transformed into a major U.S. military base in 2001. In addition, Qatar has also supported the Muslim Brotherhood by hosting exiled Brotherhood figures and allowed dissenting voices at media outlet Al Jazeera.
The blockade’s immediate cause happened when Qatari state media, the Qatar News Agency (QNA), was allegedly hacked and published statements on May 24, 2017 Emir Tamim had praised Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. This episode was just after a Riyadh summit where Trump publicly endorsed Saudi Arabia’s position against Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood.
The blockade also strengthened the unification of the people of Qatar around the Emir. The core of the blockade’s effect on unification is illustrated by the emergence of the “Tamim the Glorious” phenomenon, where posters of the slogan appeared on buildings, cars, t-shirts and social media posts that glorified him.
In a unique show of nationalistic support, thousands of people lined the streets to greet the Emir on his return from his first diplomatic mission after the blockade.
Qatar has developed its influence abroad through the tools of education, media and finances.
Education City in Doha is home to eight international branch campuses:
- The Virginia Commonwealth University School of the Arts
- Weill Cornell Medicine-Qatar
- Texas A&M University at Qatar
- Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar
- Georgetown University in Qatar
- Northwestern University in Qatar
- HEC Paris
- University College London (UCL)
As of early 2026, $62.4 billion in aggregate funding has been disclosed, making Qatar the largest foreign funder of U.S. higher education through a combination of direct gifts, contracts, long-term operating agreements and foreign branch campus support in Doha’s “Education City.”
In 2011, Qatar, through state-owned Qatar Sports Investments (QSI), acquired the Paris Saint-Germain football club (PSG) and became its sole shareholder valuing the club at €100 million in 2012. The club is now worth $4.4 billion
and the acquisition has proven very profitable for Qatar. It has enhanced Qatar’s status as a top-tier player in international sports and increased its soft power and prestige. Qatar’s exorbitant spending has also provided a means to secure strategic influence in the luxury, retail and finance sectors, which were pivotal to Qatar’s official narrative during the 2022 World Cup.
Currently, Mayhoola, the royal family’s holding company, owns Valentino, valued at €700–850 million, Balmain, (€460–500 million) and Pal Zileri. They also bought part of the Anya Hindmarch brand in the UK in 2012, but sold its stake in 2019. In the automotive and manufacturing sectors, Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) owns 17% shares in the Volkswagen Group along with Porsche, 5% in Vinci SA, 4% in Total, 6% in EADS/Airbus and 5% Veolia.
In luxury retail, they bought 1% of LVMH, 13.3% of the Lagardère Group, and owned Harrods (2010 acquisition) and Printemps (2013 acquisition, through Qatari-backed Divine Investments SA (DiSA). They also have big stakes in Barclays and Credit Suisse, and real estate interests in Canary Wharf, The Shard and Olympic Village.
Altogether from tens of billions of dollars of investment in Europe, UK, France and Germany receive the largest amounts. With its recent diversification into luxury sectors and integration with finance, real estate and sports, Qatar is leveraging its wealth and global visibility to reshape its international image. It aims to present itself as a progressive, cosmopolitan cultural and economic power that exceeds expectations based on its small geographic size.
Al Jazeera claims to be an independent news source, but numerous articles show they are funded by the Qatari government for around 90% of their budget, with the Qatar Media Corporation owning the outlet. The first of its kind eight-year study of an Arab world news channel proved this further by showing the more conflict there was between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the more coverage against Saudi Arabia was done by Al Jazeera Arabic. This suggests the outlet directly seeks to promote the national interests of the Qatari government. The U.S. government has classified Al Jazeera as a Qatari state media outlet. This means it is recognized as a propaganda arm of the Qatari government.
Internationally, Qatar uses its wealth, infrastructure, mediation, education and cultural diplomacy as displays of progress. Domestically, however, Qatar maintains authoritarian control, restricts freedom of expression, enforces male guardianship over women and upholds discriminatory personal status laws, all of which contrast sharply with its progressive international image.
Qatar’s reality
The country’s tax-free and free education system, among other benefits, is made possible by oil and gas revenues. However, citizens are a small minority of the population. 90% of the residents are migrant workers who are employed under a sponsorship system and are paid very little. The Guardian reported roughly 6,500 deaths of migrant workers from India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka between 2010 and 2020. These figures cover all causes, natural, traffic accidents, heart attacks and old age, not only construction-related incidents. Many deaths were labeled as “natural causes” without proper investigations.
In preparation for the World Cup specifically, only 37 deaths were directly linked to stadium construction: three work-related and 34 non-work-related. Qatari officials later estimated 400–500 deaths across all World Cup-related infrastructure projects. The vast majority of the 6,500 total deaths were never investigated to determine work connections, leaving significant uncertainty about worker safety and accountability.
Political authority is still solely in the hands of the Al Thani family. In 2024, a constitutional referendum was passed which, among other things, removed the option of holding future legislative elections to the Shura Council, thus eliminating any opportunities for participatory governance. Authoritarian control is further extended with the continuation of press censorship, which leads to imprisonment, as was the situation for the poet Mohamed Al-Adjami.
Al-Adjami, who was arrested in 2011, was accused of insulting Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani and was charged with the death penalty for “inciting the overthrow of the ruling system.” He was initially given a life sentence in 2012, but this was later changed to 15 years on an appeal. Al-Adjami was in solitary confinement for five months, endured a trial that was characterized by a significant lack of due process and had very limited access to counsel. He was eventually released in 2016 after receiving a royal pardon. His poem “Cairo Poem,” was recited in 2010 in support of the Arab Spring and illustrates that dissent, even in the guise of art, is aggressively punished by the state.
His trial, and his treatment, have drawn criticism from international human rights organizations like Amnesty International, PEN International and the United Nations Human Rights Office.
As restrictions remain in place in the country, same-sex relations are criminalized under multiple provisions of Qatari law. Article 296 of the Penal Code (Law 11/2004) imposes one to three years of imprisonment for “leading, instigating, or seducing’ a male to commit sodomy, or for inducing a male or female to commit ‘illegal or immoral actions.'” Article 285 punishes extramarital sex, including same-sex activity, with up to seven years’ imprisonment, while Article 298 penalizes individuals who perform adultery or sodomy “as a profession or for a living” with up to 10 years. Sharia law adds another layer, under which Muslim men could theoretically face the death penalty for same-sex sexual activity. However, in March 2022, a Qatari delegation denied capital punishment is applied for consensual same-sex acts before the U.N. Human Rights Committee. They also claimed no executions on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity are known in recent decades.
Enforcement evidence shows continued criminalization and policing of LGBTQ+ people. In 1998, an American visitor was sentenced to six months in prison and 90 lashes for homosexual activity. In February 2024, a 44-year-old British-Mexican man, Manuel Guerrero, was arrested in an alleged entrapment operation for arranging a same-sex meeting via Grindr. Human Rights Watch has documented arrests and coercive “conversion therapy” targeting transgender individuals.
State messaging situated international criticism of these laws and labor practices as an attack on Qatari culture. Qatari representatives deemed Western criticism and objections as an attack on Arab and Islamic values and thus framed such criticism as cultural imperialism. During the global backlash following the 2022 World Cup, this narrative has also been crucial to Qatar’s official response.
Inequality is further entrenched in marriage and family law. Personal Status Law No. 22 of 2006 stipulates women can only marry with the consent of a male guardian (Article 28), whereas men can have four wives. Wives must “obey” their husbands as per the law (Article 58) and if a wife does not have sex with her husband without a “legitimate” reason, she may lose financial support; further, a wife must secure permission from her husband to work. Divorce is unilateral for men; women may only do so if she meets a criterion defined by the court. Even when divorced mothers receive custody, they are not recognized as primary legal guardians. In matters of inheritance, male relatives receive double the amount as their female counterparts.
Like the other laws in Qatar, the Nationality Law No. 38 of 2005 is discriminatory toward women. Under this law, a Qatari male has the right to pass citizenship to his children, regardless of the mothers’ nationality, and to his foreign wife. However, a Qatari female, regardless of her marital status, does not have the right to pass citizenship to her children, foreign husband, or to any of her children. Under Qatari law, women have far fewer employment and educational opportunities; many government jobs and scholarships, for example, require the approval of a husband or father. Even certain birth control procedures, such as sterilization, abortion and certain prenatal care, require the permission of a male guardian and it is unclear whether this is possible outside of a marital relationship.
In addition to all of this, the Qatari penal code is a major source of women’s oppression and control. Under the Law of Penal Codes No. 11 of 2004, Article 281, 285, and other laws, sexual relations outside of marriage, including same sex relations, are punishable by imprisonment for up to seven years. Women disproportionately bear consequences, particularly in cases of pregnancy outside marriage.
In Qatar, women face systemic legal and bureaucratic obstacles to their mobility, and male guardianship systems operate as a legal requirement in almost every aspect of a woman’s life. Unlike legal formalization, the systems of unregulated practice result in a scenario where unmarried women under 30 are unable to check into hotel rooms if there is no male guardian present. Additionally, women under the age of 25 require male guardians to travel and male guardians can legally petition the courts to impose a travel restriction on women of any age.
These laws and practices are directly related to the internal oppression of women in Qatari society, as opposed to the modern image that the Qatari government tries to present to the outside world.
How to promote equality in Qatar
Qatar’s dual reality demands scrutiny. As the international community engages with Doha’s cultural initiatives, educational partnerships and sporting spectacles, it must not overlook the systemic repression beneath the surface. Governments, corporations and academic institutions should condition their collaborations on measurable progress in human rights, labor protections and women’s legal equality.
Civil society organizations must continue documenting abuses and advocating for reform. Only sustained international pressure, combined with support for Qatari civil society, can push the Al Thani regime toward genuine transformation rather than cosmetic reforms designed to preserve authoritarian control while maintaining global prestige.
Featured image: Photo by Mohamed Ansaf
Edited by: Abbigail Earl & James Sutton
