These days, it seems as if there is a conflict between countries everywhere, such as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War, the Gaza War, the 12-day Iran-Israel War and India-Pakistan tensions post-Pahalgam. There’s also the escalation of tensions between Cambodia and Thailand which demonstrates how political elites use conflict to bolster their standing domestically and reinforces ASEAN’s inability to resolve problems within their own region.
A brief background
Like with all conflicts, tensions between Cambodia and Thailand didn’t come out of nowhere. The root cause of the entire problem is French colonialism, when in 1904, Siam (Thailand) and French controlled Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) signed a border treaty. This treaty was later modified in 1907, which Cambodia uses today but Thailand considers to be inaccurate.
At the heart of the contested border between Thailand and Cambodia lies the Hindu temple Prasat Preah Vihear, built during the Khmer Empire. The Khmer Empire ruled over what is today Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. In 1962, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled the temple falls within Cambodian territory, which Thailand rejected.
Tensions over this temple emerged in 2008, when Cambodians successfully applied to include this temple as being a UNESCO designated cultural site, which Thailand protested. Later, in 2013, the ICJ once again ruled in favor of Phnom Penh and ordered Thai troops to withdraw from the temple area. In June and July, tensions over this temple remerged and escalated to the point both sides launched airstrikes into the other country’s territory.
Thailand’s monarchy
While it is true Cambodians and Thais alike are deeply nationalistic, the border dispute between the two countries was not the “headline issue” all these prior years. This latest round of tension emphasizes that at the core of this conflict are Thai and Cambodian politicians’ desire to bolster domestic legitimacy.
Prior to this crisis, Thailand was marred with popular anger over their government. Under the country’s strict lèse majesté’s laws, known as Article 112, any Thai that insults the royal family can be subjected to three to 15 years in jail. However, in 2020-2021, there were a series of popular protests against the current King Maha Vajiralongkorn.
Unlike his father King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the current king lacks any popular support and his vacation in Germany during the Covid-19 pandemic in Thailand heightened his unpopularity. During the 2023 election, even though the main reformist party, The Move Forward Party, and its allies won most of the seats, pro-monarchy parties in parliament stalled any attempts to form a government. As a result, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, from the Shinawatra political dynasty, was installed as prime minister.
The “leaked” phone call
However, despite Paetongtarn technically being part of the Thai political establishment, the military and the royal family feared the popularity of Paetongtarn’s father and former prime minister, Thaksin, could one day challenge them. After the 2006 military coup that ousted Thaksin, the Cambodian government appointed him as an economic advisor. This decision by Phnom Penh fueled paranoia by the Thai government on the closeness between the Shinawatra family and the Cambodians, especially Hun Sen. Later, during the 2014 coup, Thaksin and his sister Yingluck were allowed refuge in Cambodia on the orders of Hun Sen.
The immediate spark for the latest round of conflict was caused by a leaked phone call between Paetongtarn and Hun Sen. In the call, she said the Thai military commander was using this crisis to “look cool.” When this phone call became public, protesters called on her to resign and she was eventually suspended as prime minister. While there are no confirmed reports on who leaked the call (many allege Hun Sen leaked it), this nevertheless allowed the Thai government to sideline Paetongtarn by stoking nationalist sentiment over the border dispute. Hence, by using this crisis, the military and monarchy seek to bolster their domestic legitimacy at a time when there has been popular anger towards them.
Hun Sen’s attempted comeback
On the Cambodian side, this crisis serves as an opportunity for former Prime Minister Hun Sen to become relevant again in Cambodian politics. During the 1960s, Hun Sen joined the Communist Party and fought in the army of the Khmer Rouge, although he insists that he didn’t take part in the Cambodian Genocide. In 1997, he seized power via a coup and in 2003, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) won elections through an alliance with the Funcinpec party. Eventually in 2023, Hun Sen stepped down as prime minister and handed power to his son Hun Manet. Many Western observers and governments felt as if Hun Manet’s West Point education could make Cambodia become more “pro-West.”
However, even after nominally stepping down, Hun Sen made statements in the media saying if “my son fails to meet expectations … I would re-assume my role as prime minister.” As it relates to Thailand, it is widely alleged that Hun Sen was the one who leaked the phone call with Paetongtarn. By leaking this call, many analysts argue Hun Sen is using this crisis to reassert his influence over Cambodian politics by portraying himself as the defender of Cambodia against “Thai aggression.”
ASEAN’s centrality and its limits
In addition to the political drivers of the Thai and Cambodian dispute, the crisis also illustrates ASEAN’s inability to effectively resolve conflict. Formed in 1967, ASEAN, or known as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, was originally formed as an “anti-communist” organization. However, today, the group’s main aims are to promote economic growth across the region.
A key feature of this bloc is “ASEAN Centrality,” which insists this group should be the primary driver of regional stability and the security architecture for the region. Other external factors, such as the United States, European Union, China and India have rhetorically expressed their support for “ASEAN Centrality,” however, the reality has been more complex, as ASEAN has been unable to effectively unite during major crises.
In 2012, ASEAN did not issue a joint statement over maritime disputes between China and Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. At the time, it was seen that Cambodia and Laos were reluctant to antagonize their close ties with China.
ASEAN’s failure in conflict resolution
Likewise, in 2021, the Burmese military staged a coup d’état, ousting Aung San Suu Kyi. In response, ASEAN issued the five-point consensus, with some of the conditions being the immediate cessation of violence and seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, in spite of this five point consensus, ASEAN has remained unable to resolve the problem, largely attributed to ASEAN’s principle of non-interference. Under this principle, ASEAN would not interfere in the affairs of their member-states.
However, over time, this principle has been politicized to prevent any meaningful resolution to the region’s problems. As a result, it has been external actors outside of ASEAN that have taken on the role of “peacemaker” in Myanmar. For example, in January, Beijing brokered a ceasefire between the junta government and the rebel group Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. Even though China did this for their own interests rather than to purely benefit Myanmar, it nevertheless highlights the immense weakness of ASEAN to resolve the crisis on their own.
Thus, in a similar manner, the recent conflict between Thailand and Cambodia once again illustrates ASEAN’s inability to resolve conflicts in their own region. In fact, throughout this entire crisis, there was no major ASEAN reaction and during the July 9 ASEAN foreign affairs minister meeting, the joint communiqué did not address the conflict. As a result, outside powers have taken on the role of “peacemaker,” such as how the U.S. urged Bangkok and Phnom Penh to come to a ceasefire. Likewise, on July 30, China played a role in brokering a ceasefire between Thailand and Cambodia in Kuala Lumpur.
On the one hand, this situation between Thailand and Cambodia proves there is nothing inherently wrong for external powers to aid in conflict resolution. However, if ASEAN is unable to resolve problems in their own region, it raises the question if ASEAN can effectively safeguard its interests at a time when the Indo-Pacific is in such need of help from outside powers.
Featured image: Photo by Vicky T on Unsplash
Edited by Abbigail Earl and James Sutton
